made was by making the Court of Commissioners part of the High Court; certiorari did not lie to it, but when it was desired to bring up a record in a criminal case, an order was made to bring the record from one part of the High Court, the Court of the Commissioners, to another, e. g., the Queen's Bench Division. 5 No additional powers were given to the trial judge; applications for a new trial must still be made to the "court above." Of the five divisions into which the High Court was divided, three were common-law divisions: the Queen's Bench, the Common Pleas and the Exchequer Divisions-in all cases in any of these divisions, whether the case was tried with or without a jury, an application for a new trial was made to the divisional court "in term" for an order to show cause why a new trial should not be directed, quite the same as the rule nisi in the former practice ;7 an appeal lay to the Court of Appeal. In 1876 a rule of court directed the application to be made to the Court of Appeal if the case was tried without a jury.
When the common-law divisions were consolidated into one, the Queen's Bench Division, in i88o, 8 the new rules substituted a simple notice of motion for an order nisi and changed the form in some instances-where the trial was by a judge without a jury, the application must be by appeal to the Court of Appeal, where with a jury in the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division to a divisional court of that division and in every other case to a divisional court of the Queen's Bench Division. 9 Moreover, it was expressly provided that "no judge shall sit on the hearing of any motion for a new trial in any cause or matter tried with a jury before himself." 10 The Act of 189611 directs that all motions for a new trial are to be made to the Court of Appeal "in any cause or matter in the High Court in which there has been a trial thereof, or of any issue therein with a jury." The effect of this enactment is to eliminate the divisional court ;12
See, per Lord Coleridge, C. J., in Queen v. Dudley and Stephens (i884) L. R. 14 Q. B. D. 273, 280. a We shall see that from 1883, the right of a trial judge to take part in the hearing of an. application for a new trial in a case tried before him was taken away.
"In the Chancery Division, whose judges had not a Nisi Prius commission, the application for a "rehearing" was to the judge: the judge before whom the action was pending could order a new trial of an issue directed by himself. In the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division, the application was to the judge who tried the case.
" 
IN ENGLAND-CRIMINAL CASES
We have seen that at the common law there was no power in any court t6 grant a new trial in cases of felony, and that while power was considered to exist in the Court of King's Bench to grant a new trial in cases of misdemeanor, the power was sparingly exercised,--never when there was an acquittal except in certain quasi-civil cases, e. g., in Quo Warranto.3 In the previous article, no account was taken of the venire facias de novo juratores, which was not technically an order for a new trial, but which had substantially the same effectthis was awarded by the court (not the trial judge) where a jury was discharged without verdict, where a special verdict was insufficient and in a court of error in cases of mistrial or imperfect verdict.
None of these powers was affected in any way by the various judicature acts, but in 1907 a very great change was effected by the Criminal Appeal Act of 19o7.14 This act abolished writs of errors and all the jurisdiction and practice of the King's Bench Division (which had, under the judicature acts, succeeded to the position of the former Court of King's Bench) as to the grant of new trials in criminal cases, and substituted an appeal against a conviction to a Court of Criminal Appeal on questions of law or (by leave) on questions of fact, or of mixed law and fact, or as to the legality or propriety of the sentence imposed. But no power was given to grant a new trial; and however regrettable the result-an appeal succeeding even on the ground of misdirection to the jury-the conviction is quashed and the accused goes free. "It is to be regretted the Legislature when passing the Criminal Appeal Act did not empower the Court to order a new trial, for the present is a case in which it is eminently desirable that such a power should exist. But they did not think fit to do so, and we have no choice but to allow the appeal."
This was a case of misdirection as was the later case of Rex v. Ahlers (1914) 24 Cox. C. C. 623, where a German-born British subject escaped the punishment of high treason. The act provided that commissions of Assize and Nisi Prius should be issued into each district once or twice yearly as was thought proper for the trial of issues in vacation between terms; and power was given to issue special commissions to try special offenders, i. e., special commissions of Oyer and Terminer.
the trial judge in case of a conviction for crime to reserve any question of law which might have arisen on the trial for the consideration of the justices of either bench or the barons of the Exchequer. These, a Court for Crown Cases Reserved, had large powers but not the power to grant a new trial.
"A full description pf these curious courts will be found in a series of articles, It was not until 1855 ' 9 that commissions of Assize and Nisi Prius, Oyer and Terminer and General Gaol Delivery were rendered unnecessary, Parliament providing that such courts should be held at such times as the judges of the courts of common law (by this time a Court of Common Pleas had been formed" with the same powers as the Court of Queen's Bench) should appoint. The judges of the courts of common law were to sit in these courts of Assize and Nisi Prius, Oyer and Terminer and General Gaol Delivery with the same powers as though they had commissions as formerly.
By the Common Law Procedure Act of 185621 the times of the sittings of these trial courts were to be fixed by the judges, and the judges might sit with or without commissions as the Governor (i. e., the Ministry) should deem best. In 1874 the Administration of Justice Act 3 provided for Courts of Assize and Nisi Prius to be held without commissions and that any judge or Queen's Counsel presiding at any court of Assize, Nisi Prius, Oyer and Terminer and General Gaol Delivery should have all the powers which he would have had under commissions under the former practice.
It may be said that since the act of i856 we have not had in Ontario commissions for trial courts, except special commissions of Oyer and Terminer, etc., the power to issue which is still continued and has been exercised.
When in i881, the two common-law courts and the court of chancery were united in one court, the Supreme Court of judicature for Ontario, 24 there was an express provision for commissions of Assize, etc., issuing by proper authority, but the existing condition was not interfered with that the ordinary trial courts should be held with or without a commission as the Governor (i. e., the Ministry) should deem best. At the present time the days upon which such courts are to begin their sittings, and the judge who is to preside over each, are fixed by the judges of the High Court Division of the Supreme Court and no commission issued. But no power was ever given to a judge presiding at a trial court to grant a new trial: when the Courts of Queen's (King's) Bench and Common Pleas were separate and distinct courts, the application for a new trial must be made in term to the court from which process issued. When by the Judicature Act of 1881 the courts were amalgamated, there was still 18 Vic. Ch. 92, sec. 43 (Can. It is not necessary to trace the history of the practice of new trial in the other Provinces; in none of them has the trial judge any power in that regard and the application must be made to the "court above."
' Before the Judicature Act of I88i, common-law actions were begun by writs which were issued from the two common-law courts alternately (in order to equalize the work of the two courts, each of which had the same jurisdiction, practice, etc.) : proceedings in chancery were begun by bill of complaint The Judicature Act abolished the bill of complaint and directed that all actions (now including suits) should begin by writ of summons, but that the writ should be styled in one or other division-Queen's Bench Division, Common Pleas Division or Chancery Division, secs. 23, 25. Writs in the Queen's Bench and Common Pleas Division were to be issued alternately, R. 21. The action was accordingly styled in some division and application for a new trial was made to the divisional court (generally of three but sometimes only two judges) of that division, R. 3o7. The application was by way of order nisi corresponding to the former rule nisi-in the Court of Appeal, a simple notice .was given.
"When the rules were amended in i888 (in force March ist, i888) it was directed that writs should issue alternately from the Queen's Bench, Chancery and Common Pleas Divisions (R. 226) ; and that after a trial by a judge without a jury, the application for a new trial might be made either to the divisional court or the Court of Appeal.
By rules coming into force September Ist, 1897: R. 127, Forms I, 2, 3.
The statute 3 & 4 Geo. V, Ch. ig--The Judicature Act-brought into force January ist, 1913, by proclamation. This forms one superior court, the Supreme Court of Ontario, with two divisions, the Appellate Division and the High Court Division-the latter being the trial division. I may add that while there has never been any express prohibition against the trial judge sitting in a court upon an application for a new trial in a case tried before him, it has never been done since the abolition of the practice of issuing writs out of a particular division.
IN UPPER CANADA (ONTAIO)--CRIMINAL CASES
In Upper Canada the English practice was followed: there was no new trial in felonies, nor in misdemeanors in cases of acquittal except in certain quasi-civil cases.
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In 1851 an act was passed° which enabled the trial judge in case of a conviction to reserve a case for the consideration of either common-law court, but it was held that this did not empower the court to grant a new trial.3 1 In 1857,-2 Parliament enacted that a person convicted of a crime might "apply for a new trial upon any point of law or question of fact in as ample a manner as any person may apply to the Superior Courts of Common Law for a new trial in a civil action" and "if the conviction be affirmed the person convicted may appeal to the Court of Error and Appeal."
If the conviction was in the Quarter Sessions, the application for a new trial must be made to that court and if the appeal should fail, a further appeal lay to a court of common law. In 1869,3 all power was taken away from every court to gran~t a new trial. Thereafter the convicted person must rely upon a case reserved for one of the common-law courts; the appeal from the common-law courts to the Court of Error and Appeal was also taken away.
When the Criminal Code was enacted in 1892, Supreme Court of Ontario, and a convict may move without the leave of the attorney general; if he moves on the ground of weight of evidence, however, he must obtain the leave of the trial judge.
3 5
IN THE UNITED STATES
The common law of England became the common law of the United States as it had been the common law of the thirteen colonies: while there is no report of any decision in the colonies before the Revolution granting a new trial, there is no doubt that the courts of general jurisdiction exercised the power of granting new trials in proper cases.
The Nisi Prius system was not in vogue and the trial judge (at least in most cases) sat as the court and not as a mere commissioner; and he it was to whom the application for a new trial was made. In Massachusetts the Nisi Prius system was adopted in 1803-4 with the necessary consequence:
8 but in most cases the trial judge was always "the court."
In "If the second verdict was the same as the first, it was conclusive unless the court, in its discretion, should see fit to set it aside. If the result of the second trial was different from that of the first, the losing party had a right, by a process of review, to have another trial. The losing party in the third trial, having had two verdicts against him, was concluded thereby, unless the court should grant him a new trial. By this system it was not thought safe to rely upon the finding of a single jury. A party could claim a re-trial as matter of right until two verdicts had gone against him, and even then the court had the power to grant another trial if in their discretion they should deem it proper. This system commenced at an early period, and was in operation for a long time. It continued for some years after Maine became a separate State. I had then some agency in bringing about a change."
"0 fortunatos nimium sua si bona norint advocati." 'Bartholomew v. Clark (1816) 1 Conn. 472, 473, per N. Smith (arguendo) . . which was granted of course to the unsuccessful party, until there had been two verdicts the same way." The reporter, Thomas Day, adds a note: "This practice still exists, to a certain degree, in some of the New-England states." It certainly did exist in Massachusetts, as Maine did not become a separate state till 182o,--and we have seen that the practice was in vogue in Massachusetts at that time.
But the rule in granting new trials became much the same as in England in respect of grounds for such a proceeding. At the present time in practically every state of the Union, the trial judge has power to grant a new trialV9 New Jersey is an exception: there the practice is to apply to the trial judge for a rule to show cause why the verdict should not be set aside and a new trial ordered (the common-law rule nisi) ; the rule is then argued before the full court (the trial judge being a member) in term. This is substantially the common-law system, except that in New Jersey it is the trial judge and not the court en banc who grants the rule to show cause.
In most of the states it is considered that the power of the trial judge to grant a new trial is purely statutory: but in some it is considered that the right is "inherent in the trial court" (Alabama), that the right is a common-law right (Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota), but regulated and modified by statute (Missouri, New York, North Carolina, Wisconsin). Connecticut thinks it an affirmance of the common law; Indiana can trace her statutory power back to 1852; Maine derived her jurisprudence from Massachusetts but now it seems to be wholly statutory.
0
The decision of the trial judge is final in Delaware, Maine and New Mexico; where a new trial is granted there is no appeal in California (though the order is reviewable on an appeal from the judgment), Colorado, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri (in criminal cases); in North Carolina an appeal from the trial judge's decision is allowed only when a new trial is granted on the ground of error committed in the trial, while in South Carolina the supreme court cannot review the facts and can grant a new trial only where a question of law is involved on which the trial judge has made an erroneous finding.
In the other states named in note 39, there is an -appeal from the decision of the trial judge.
I have not considered the case of inferior courts.7 in all instances any power they possess to grant a new trial is statutory; nor have I considered the venire de novo employed where the verdict was defective, etc.--in some states, e. g., Indiana, that is considered not affected by legislation.
" I have to thank the chief justices of the following states for their ready and courteous answers to my enquiries: Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Wisconsin, Wyoming.
I have not made an independent examination but have contented myself with the information these eminent gentlemen have given me either expressly or by reference to authority.
" See Averill v. Rooney (1871) 59 Me. 58o, Laws of x872, Ch. 83: R. S. (i9o3) Ch. 84, sec. 54.
